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Abstract: The current global drive towards devolution of financial resources and responsibilities has 
been increasingly justified on the basis that greater transfers of these financial resources and 
responsibilities to sub-central governments are theoretically expected to deliver greater economic 
efficiency in the provision of public goods and services and hence greater economic growth. There is 
a mixed result on these theoretical expectations across earlier empirical literatures. Using the 
instrumental variables (IV) technique of analysis with the recent data from Nigeria for the period 
1970-2013, this study found no robust significant effect of the decentralisation of spending or revenue 
on growth of real GDP per capital in Nigeria. The implication of this to the policy makers is that 
when it comes to the determinants of improved economic activities, decentralisation either fiscal 
expenditure or revenue side would not be instrumental to economic growth possibly because of 
existence of endemic corruption among politicians in Nigeria.  
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1. Introduction  
Nigerian and other African governments have undergone repeated decentralisation 
reforms as many developing countries have a mandate to decentralize aspects of 
their public finance and concurrently, there has been a considerable debate in the 
developed countries such as the United State and OECD countries in the recent 
years on the merits of such fiscal decentralization. Much of these recent 
movements devolving of revenue collection and expenditure to local authorities 
have been driven by belief that fiscal decentralization enhances government 
efficiency in the public sector, cut the budget deficit, enhance service delivery and 
economic growth as first expressed by Tiebout (1956) and others studies like Oates 
(1972; 1999), Xie et al (1999). Generally, such transfer of fiscal power, 
responsibility and resources to lower tiers of government allows for even regional 
development in terms of provision of public goods and services to meet local needs 
and this will in turn reduce poverty level and promote overall economic 
                                                     
1 Department of Local Government Studies, Obafemi Awolowo University, Nigeria, Address: Ile-Ife, 
Osun State, Nigeria, Tel.: +2348038063669, Corresponding Author: adefesoha@yahoo.com. 
AUDŒ, Vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 102-115 
ŒCONOMICA 
 
 103 
performance. This is because government at lower levels have informational 
advantages over the central government concerning the improved and efficient 
resource allocation (Oates, 1972) and therefore they are in a better position to 
identify and deliver the kind of public goods and services that match local 
preferences and needs and over time efficiency gains will lead to the development 
of local as well as national economy at large. 
Other scholars however, have challenged the significance of the economic 
efficiency of fiscal decentralization on service delivery of local government, 
reduction of poverty level and economic growth and development. They are of 
opinion that the informational advantage claimed by local government may not be 
significant because the central government may appoint its representatives to local 
offices where they purposely to gain the knowledge about local preferences under 
fiscal centralized system, so the government at the centre delegates and not 
devolves of fiscal responsibilities as in the case of fiscal decentralization. Even the 
central government can also involve worker at sub-central governmental level 
during the decision making process, this will influence resource allocative 
efficiency. The local government officials are not adequately trained most 
especially in the developing countries, this is because they are not elected into 
office through a democratic election and if they are, there is still the problem of 
availability of greater incentive to process information (World bank, 1995). It has 
also been argued that the control of macroeconomic and in particularly corruption 
at lower levels of government would be more difficult as it gives room for 
politicians to embezzle public funds (Suleiman, 2009).  
Following this theoretical disagreement is the empirical estimation which tends to 
be ambiguous and inconclusive as a result of differing results. For example, while a 
strand of argument asserts confidently for single-country studies there exist 
positive and significant relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic 
growth(Nguygen and Anwar, 2011) that fiscal decentralisation  does not have 
economic impact because of the benefits derived from economies of scale in the 
provision and delivery of public goods (Thieben 2000), the study of Davoodi and 
Zou (1998) concluded that fiscal decentralisation is negatively correlated to 
economic activity in developing countries but has no significance in developed 
countries compared with findings of Prud‘homme (1995) who argued that fiscal 
decentralisation is fundamentally suitable for developed countries and also 
compared with the conclusion of Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2003) which 
revealed significantly positive effect of fiscal decentralisation for developing 
countries alone. The evidence is that the link between decentralization and growth 
is not straightforward and is largely influenced by country specificities, as well as 
process design. Despite this, 63 of 75 transition and developing economies with 
populations of 5m people are either have granted or in the process of granting fiscal 
decentralization policy by transferring financial resourses and responsibilities to 
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local government. (Woller and Philips, 1998; Rodriguez-Pose and Kroijer, 
2009) 
Obviously, whether or not there is any significant growth and efficiency gained 
associated with fiscal decentralization can never be settled merely on theoretical 
grounds alone. It must be subjected to rigorous empirical analysis (World bank, 
1995) which is the thrust of this study. Most of the existing studies on the subject 
matter have been narrowly concerned with analysing the trend of 
intergovernmental relations within the limited context of political economy or 
using merely narrative and descriptive analysis to establish differential or unequal 
allocation of revenue and functions among tiers of government (see for example 
Suberu 1991, Akindele and Olaopa 2002) and impact of such on the Nigerian 
economy. And this has equally led to the review with a view of finding appropriate 
revenue formula in Nigeria which is one of the most decentralized countries in the 
continent. This methodology is grossly inadequate in analyzing Fiscal 
Decentralization-Economic Growth nexus (World Bank, 1995) which is scarcely 
explored (Breuss and Eller, 2004) most especially in developing country and hence 
this study.  
Moreover, several studies have employed Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimation technique to empirically examine the impact of fiscal decentralisation 
on economic growth despite the fact that a number of studies have identified the 
possibility of reverse causality and endogeneity among fiscal decentralisation and 
economic growth (see for example, Adefeso and Saibu 2014, Jin, et al. 2005, 
Thiessen (2003), Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2003, Xie et al. 1999, Zhang and 
Zuo 1998). Specifically, Adefeso and Saibu (2014) and Martinez-Vazquez and 
McNab (2003) argue and concluded that reversal causality exists because 
efficiency and other benefits derives from fiscal decentralisation emerge as 
countries grow and develop. However, existing literature does not control for this 
endogeneity and this has made the OLS estimates to be biased and not consistent. 
This study departs from other studies by catering for the problem of endogeneity 
through the application of Two-Stage Least Square (TSLS) on the over-identified 
equations. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 focuses on 
Empirical Literature Review surrounding the fiscal decentralisation and economic 
growth nexus. Theoretical Framework and Methodology are discussed in section 3 
and the study is wrapped up by section 4 which focuses on empirical results and 
concluding remark. 
  
ŒCONOMICA 
 
 105 
2. Empirical Literature Review 
The following table provides the summary of conflicting results of the main studies 
on fiscal decentralisation and economic growth nexus on time series analyses up 
till date. 
Table 2.1. Summary of Single Country Empirical studies on the Fiscal 
Decentralisation Policy and Economic Growth nexus 
Studies Countries  Period  Main results  
Hammond, Tosun 
(2009) 
 
 
 
Qiao et al. (2008) 
 
 
 
Akai, Nishimura, 
Sakata (2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hammond, Tosun 
(2006) 
 
 
 
Solle-Olle, 
Esteller-More 
(2006) 
 
Cantarero, Perez 
Gonzales (2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Huang, Cheng 
(2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United State 
 
 
 
 
China 
 
 
 
United State 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United State 
 
 
 
Spain 
 
 
 
Spain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1970-2000 
 
 
 
 
1985-1998 
 
 
 
1992-1997             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1970-2000 
 
 
 
1977-1998 
 
 
 
1985-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1996-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Revenue decentralisation is 
positive for income growth in 
metropolitan areas (10% increase 
in centralisation decreases 
growth by 0.28% ), but has no 
effect overall 
Fiscal decentralisation has 
enhanced growth but the 
relationship between the two 
variables is non-linear. 
 
Non linear, humped-shaped 
relationship between fiscal 
federalism and growth. The 
optimal degree of fiscal 
decentralisation is higher than 
what is observed for the revenue-
share, hence the US would gain 
in terms of growth from more 
fiscal decentralisation on the 
revenue side. 
Relatively weak or negative 
relationship in non-metropolitan 
areas as opposed to positive 
impact in metropolitan areas. 
 
Fiscal decentralisation is positive 
for road and educational 
investment and capital stock, and 
should therefore be beneficial to 
growth. 
 
No relationship between 
expenditure decentralisation and 
growth. Positive 
relationship between revenue 
decentralisation and growth.10% 
increase in revenue 
decentralisation adds 0.5% to 
GDP per capita growth. No 
evidence of non-linearities. 
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Zhang and Zou 
(1998)  
28 Chinese 
Provinces  
1987-1993 Annual 
Data 
The direct effect of fiscal 
decentralisation on growth has 
been negative. But squared terms 
suggest non-linear, U-shaped 
relationship. In highly centralised 
countries, fiscal decentralisation 
decreases growth; however this 
effect becomes smaller with 
higher decentralisation; and 
above a certain threshold 
additional decentralisation is 
beneficial for regional growth. 
Decentralization of expenditure 
to the provinces reduces growth 
of real GDP per capita.  
Lin and Liu 
(2000)  
28 Chinese 
Provinces  
1970-1993 Annual 
Data 
Revenue decentralization by 10% 
increases growth of real GDP per 
capita by 2.7%-points (5% signif-
cance level)  
Carrion-i-Silvestre 
et al. (2008) 
 
 
 
 
Malik, Hassan, 
Hussain (2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
Jin, Qian and 
Weingast (2005)  
Spain 
 
 
 
 
 
4 province of 
Pakinstan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 Chinese 
Provinces  
1980-1998 
 
 
 
 
 
1971-2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1982-1992 Annual 
Data 
Fiscal decentralisation has a 
positive effect both on regional 
and national economic growth. 
The effect of the expenditure side 
is stronger than the revenue side. 
 
Both the expenditure share and 
the own revenues share have a 
positive and significant effect on 
growth (estimated oefficients are 
0.54 and 0.62 respectively. 
When grants are included in SCG 
revenues the effect of revenue 
decentralisation is however found 
to be negative (-0.17) but 
insignificant. 
 
Expenditure decentralization by 
10% increases growth of real 
GDP per capita by 1.6%-points 
(10% significance level)  
 
Akai, Nishimura, 
Sakata (2004) 
 
Akai, Sakata 
(2002) 
 
 
 
 
Qiao, Martinez 
50 states of United 
State 
 
50 states of United 
States 
 
 
 
 
28 Chinese 
1992-1997 
 
 
1992-1996 
 
 
 
 
 
1985-1998  
Fiscal decentralisation has 
positive effect on economic 
growth and negative effect on 
economic volatility. 
Decentralisation has a positive 
impact on state gross product. 
Increase in expenditure 
decentralisation by 10% 
increases growth by 1.6-3.2 
percentage points. 
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Vazquez and Xu 
(2002)  
Provinces   
Expenditure decentralization in-
creases growth of nominal GDP 
per capita significantly (5% 
significance level)  
Feltenstein and 
Iwata (2005)  
Central Level in 
China  
1952-1996  Fiscal decentralization has 
adverse implications for 
macroeconomic stability but 
tends to increase growth  
Jin and Zou 
(2005)  
30 Chinese 
Provinces  
1979-1999  Divergence between local 
expenditures and revenue (i.e. 
centralization) increases growth  
 
Zhang and Zou 
(2001)  
 
29 Chinese 
Provinces  
 
1987-1993, annual 
data  
 
Decentralization reduces 
economic growth  
Zhang and Zou 
(2001)  
16 Indian States  1970-1994  Decentralization increases 
economic growth  
Desai, Freink-man 
and Gold-berg 
(2003)  
80 Russian 
Regions  
1996-1999  Decentralization has a positive 
but non-linear effect on growth  
Naumets (2003)  24 Ukrainian 
Oblasts and 
Autonomous 
Republic of 
Crimea  
1998-2000  Not robust negative impact of 
own revenue decentralization on 
growth of real gross value added  
Xie, Zou and 
Davoodi (1999)  
Central Level in 
the USA  
1951-1992  No significant impact of 
expenditure decentralization on 
growth of real GDP per capita  
Akai and Sa-kata 
(2002)  
50 US States  1992-1996, Cross-
Section of Aver-
age Growth Rates, 
Panel with Annual 
Data  
Expenditure decentralization by 
10% increases growth of GDP per 
capita by 1.6-3.2%-points (robust 
10% significance levels)  
Stansel (2005)  314 US Metro-
politan Areas  
1960-1990  Higher fragmentation is associated 
with significantly higher growth in 
(log) real per capita money 
income.  
Berthold, Drews 
and Thode (2001)  
16 Laender  1991-1998  Higher horizontal and vertical 
grants significantly reduce growth 
of nominal GDP per capita  
Behnisch, Buttner 
and Stegarescu 
(2002)  
Central Level in 
Germany  
1950-1990  Increase of federal share of 
expenditure in total expenditure 
has positive effect on German 
productivity growth  
Gil-Serrate and 
Lopez-Laborda 
(2006)  
17 Spanish 
Autonomous 
Communities  
1984-1995  Revenue control decentralization 
has a positive effect on 
decentralization  
Feld, Kirch-
gassner, and 
Schaltegger (2004, 
2005)  
 
26 Swiss Can-tons  
 
 
 
Both cross-
1980-1998  Tax autonomy and tax competition 
are not harmful for economic 
growth  
 
There is no evidence of direct link 
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Feld, 
Schnellenbach 
(2009) 
country and 
within-country 
between fiscal decentralisation and 
growth 
 
Akai and Sa-kata 
(2002)  
50 US States  1992-1996, Cross-
Section of Aver-
age Growth Rates, 
Panel with Annual 
Data  
Expenditure decentralization by 
10% increases growth of GDP per 
capita by 1.6-3.2%-points (robust 
10% significance levels)  
Stansel (2005)  
 
 
 
 
314 US Metro-
politan Areas  
1960-1990  Higher fragmentation is 
associated with significantly 
higher growth in (log) real per 
capita money income  
Berthold, Drews 
and Thode (2001)  
16 Laender  1991-1998  Higher horizontal and vertical 
grants significantly reduce growth 
of nominal GDP per capita  
Behnisch, Buttner 
and Stegarescu 
(2002)  
Central Level in 
Germany  
1950-1990  Increase of federal share of 
expenditure in total expenditure 
has positive effect on German 
productivity growth  
Gil-Serrate and 
Lopez-Laborda 
(2006)  
17 Spanish 
Autonomous 
Communities  
1984-1995  Revenue control decentralization 
has a positive effect on 
decentralization  
Feld, Kirch-
gassner, and 
Schaltegger (2004, 
2005)  
Feld, 
Schnellenbach 
(2009) 
26 Swiss Can-tons  
 
 
Both cross-
country and 
within-country 
1980-1998  Tax autonomy and tax competition 
are not harmful for economic 
growth  
 
There is no evidence of direct link 
between fiscal decentralisation and 
growth 
 
Source: Author collection (2014) 
 
3. Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
The theoretical model of fiscal decentralisation and economic growth assumes 
without loss of generality, three levels of government namely federal, state and 
local. Fiscal decentralisation level is the spending by sub-national governments as a 
fraction of the total government spending. For instance, fiscal decentralisation 
increases if spending by state and local governments rises relative to spending by 
the federal government. Barro (1990) presents the production function where the 
interaction between private capital and public services are elegantly captured. This 
simple model explores a link between public services and economic growth. In this 
model, the government uses income tax revenues to finance public services which 
are considered to be inputs to private production. It is this complementarity 
between public services and private capital that creates a potentially positive 
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linkage between public services and economic growth in the model. The models 
specifically shows that spending on public services which enhance the productivity 
of the private capital or firms that creates a potentially positive linkage between 
public services and economic growth in the model as shown below: 
y =  A    .......................................................................................1 
where y stands for economic growth, k is the private capita and g is the publicly 
provided services. a, b, c and d measure parameter efficiency. 
This study however departs from Barro model and follows Davoodi and 
Zou (1998) by assuming that public spending is carried out by three levels of 
government namely: federal, state and local. Assume that k represents private 
capital, g is the total public spending on the provision of public services and it is 
the composition of f, federal government spending, s, state government spending 
and l, local government spending. i.e.  
g = f + s + l.........................................................................................2 
The resulted production function is Cobb-Douglas production function exhibits 
constant return to scale as specified below: 
 y =            ...................................................................................3 
where a + b + c + d = 1 and 0< a, b, c, d <1, 0< b <1, 0< c <1, 0< d <1. The total 
government spending, g, among different levels of government takes the following 
form: 
f =   g,  s =   g, l =   g...............................................4 
where    +    +    = 1 and 0<    < 1 for i = f, s, and l.    is the share of 
federal government in total spending,    and    are the share of state and local 
government in total spending respectively. The consolidated government spending 
g is financed by a flat output tax at rate τ: 
  g = τy,   τ = g/y ........................................................................5 
in order to derive the long-run growth rate of the economy, the analysis of the 
decision made by the private sector is crucial. Taken the government‘s decisions on 
τ as given, a long-lived representative individual who maximizes his discounted 
utility,  
Max U = ∫
      
   
 
 
       .........................................................................6 
where c is the consumption of the public goods and services produced in this 
economy; 𝜎 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and p is the 
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rate of time preference. The dynamic budget constraint the consumer faces is: 
              
  
  
 = (1 - τ)y – c  (1 - τ)             – c .............................7 
given the total government spending g, a constant tax rate τ, and the shares of 
spending by different levels of governments mi‘s, where i = f, s, l. The 
representative agent‘s choice of consumption is determined by equation 6 subject 
to equation 7 and the government‘s budget allocation. The consumer then chooses 
optimally the consumption path {c(t): t   } and path of the capital stock {k(t) : t 
  } which characterised balanced growth path. The consumer‘s optimal 
allocation of resources is derived through Hamiltonian: 
L= (
      
   
) +  {(     )            –   }..................................................8 
              
  
  
 = 0           =    …….………………………………….  9 
  
  
  
= - 
  
  
     {(     ) 
 
 
                –   }………………………10 
 
  
  
 = 
  
  
    (     )            –    ………………………………………………..11 
The solution for per capital growth rate of the economy along balanced growth 
path is given by  
 
 
 
= 
 
 
 {(    )   
 
 
    
   
  
   
  
   
   }..............................................12 
The equation above shows that long run growth rate per capital output of the 
economy which is the measure of economic growth is a function of the tax rate and 
the shares of spending by different levels of government and exogenous factor. 
This forms the basis for the empirical examination of the relationship between 
fiscal decentralisation and economic growth and a country is more fiscally 
centralized if   has higher value as noted in the literature.  
Given a share of total government spending in GDP and if the actual allocation 
diverges from the growth-maximizing expenditure share, some reallocation of 
public spending among three levels of governments will be growth-enhancing. This 
can be shown by maximising equation (9) while choosing       and    subject 
to the    +    +    = 1. The growth-maximising government budget shares are 
simply the following: 
      
  = 
 
     
 ..................................................................13 
         
  = 
 
     
 ....................................................................14 
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  = 
 
     
......................................................................15 
It is therefore, clear that the growth-maximising spending shares are equal to the 
ratios of individual productivity over the aggregate productivity and as long as the 
existing government budget shares do not correspond to growth-maximizing 
shares, the growth rate and hence economic growth can always be increased 
without altering the total budget‘s share in GDP. 
3.1. Model Specification 
The simultaneous regression equation that will be estimated on Nigerian economy 
using annual data from 1970 to 2013 are pooled from statistical bulletin published 
by Central Bank of Nigeria and African Development Indicator is specified below: 
    =     +      +      +       +    ..................................................16  
   =    +      +      +    ..............................................................17 
where t is the number of time periods, ,   ,    are scalar parameters while      is 
a vector.    is the average growth rate,   is the measure of fiscal decentralisation 
and    is the tax rate.    is a vector of control variables which are health 
expenditure, human capita and openess,    is the public burrowing theoretically, 
that there is positive relationship between degree of decentralisation and public 
borrowing rate of sub-nationals (Treisman, 2000) and     and     is the 
disturbance term that is assumed to be serially uncorrelated and orthogonal to the 
explanatory variables. The focus of this research are the coefficients    and    
which may be positive or negative and statistically significant given the 
conventional arguments in favour or against of average growth rate and fiscal 
decentralization policy respectively. 
The consequences of ignoring the endogeneity problem discussed briefly in section 
1 as this study has noticed in numerous studies is that the estimated result will be 
baised and inconsistent because error term of such equation is correlated with the 
explanatory variable of the equation.  In other to overcome the econometric 
problems of endogeneity from equation 13 and 14 which are structural equation of 
the simultaneous equations model where    and    are the endogenous variables 
and    vector and    are strictly exogenous variables, the study estimate an over 
identified equation using the method of Two-Stage Least Square (TSLS). 
3.2 . Multivariate Cointegration Analysis and Error Correction Modeling 
The cointegration analysis is fairly common and is well documented in the studies 
like Banerjee, et. al 1993; Hylleberg and Mizon 1989; Engle and Granger 1987; 
Johansen 1988; Johansen and Juselius 1990. Only summary is provided for here. 
According to Johansen (1988), multivariate cointegration model is based on the 
error correction representation given by:  
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Yt  =   +∑   
   
   Yt-i +  Yt–1+ εt ..............................................(18) 
Where Yt is an (nx1) column vector of ρ variables, μ is an (nx1) vector of constant 
terms, α and β captured coefficient matrices, Δ is a difference operator, and εt ~ 
IID(0, 𝜎 ). The coefficient matrix β is known as the impact matrix, and it contains 
information about the long-run relationships. Johansen‘s methodology requires the 
estimation of the VAR equation (3) and the residuals are then used to compute two 
likelihood ratio (LR) test statistics that can be used in the determination of the 
unique cointegrating vectors of Yt. The cointegrating rank can be tested with two 
statistics: the trace test and the maximal eigenvalue test. 
 
4. Empirical Results and Concluding Remark 
Analysis of the time series data employed in this study tend to exhibit either a 
determistic and/or stochastic time trend and are therefore non stationary at level; 
i.e., the variables in question have, means, variances and covariances that are not 
time invariant except expenditure on health and public burrowing. Direct 
application of OLS or GLS to non-stationary data produces regressions that are 
misspecified or spurious in nature (Engle and Granger, 1987). We therefore, 
subjected the variables for a unit root test using an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
(ADF) (Dickey-Fuller,1981) and Philip-Perron test (Philip-Perron, 1988). The 
results of this stationarity tests at level show that most of the variables are non 
stationary at level. We then difference the variables once in order to carry out 
stationarity tests on the differenced variables, the results of this confirmed 
stationarity as shown in the table 2 below:  
Table 2. Result of the Unit Root Tests based on Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
Series Level 1st Difference Order of Integration 
Log g -0.971543 -3.901088 I(1) 
Log m (expenditure 
side) 
-2.271678 -8.203590 I(1) 
Log m (revenue side) -3.497761 -8.846321 I(1) 
Log T -1.481866 -7.008466 I(1) 
Log P -4.600091  I(0) 
Log hc -1.902905 -4.391112 I(1) 
Log opens -3.054406 -7.334921 I(1) 
Log health -4.617369  I(0) 
Note: All variables and symbols are defined earlier.  
Source: Author computation (2014) 
This shows that most of the variables involved are integration of order 1. The next 
step is to test for the existence of a cointegration relationship among the variables 
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using the Johansen Cointegration approach described above. The Johansen 
Cointegration test result indicates the existence of cointegration between variables 
employed. The maximum trace statistics reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration at 5 per cent level.  
Table 3. Two Stage Least Square Estimation 
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Per Capital GDP 
Variables     OLS     OLS IV         IV 
C -4.65415* -5.0585* -4.6542** -5.05848* 
D(log m) Expenditure 
side -0.03407  -0.03407  
D(log m)  
Revenue side  -0.10378  -0.10378 
D(Log t) 0.28017*** 0.23512*** 0.28017*** 0.23518*** 
D(Log hc) 0.10330 0.15352 0.10330 0.15355 
Log health 0.36374** 0.39505* 0.36374** 0.39505* 
D(log opness) -0.00548 0.00369 -0.00548 0.003685 
No. of Observation 44 44 44 44 
Adj R2 0.39098 0.4065 0.39099 0.4788 
D.W 1.6980 1.6265 1.6980 1.6265 
Note: *, ** represent 5%, 10% level of significance, *** represents both 5%, 10% level of 
significance 
Source: Author Computation (2014) 
In term of statistical significance, fiscal decentralisation measure either at 
expenditure side or revenue side is statistically insignificant in all the regressions 
while other explanatory variables like for example tax rate and health which are 
statistically significant and positively correlated with economic growth.  This 
empirical result is supported by the study of Woller and Philips (1998) which failed 
to find any strong and systematic relationship between fiscal decentralisation and 
economic growth in the developing countries. Other literatures that arrived at this 
conclusion include Xie, Zou and Davoodi (1999), Nauumets (2003), Bodman and 
Ford (2006). This study therefore concludes that fiscal decentralisation is not 
instrumental to economic growth in Nigeria.  
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